We study the role of a market maker (or market operator) in a transmission constrained electricity market. We model the market as a one-shot networked Cournot competition where generators supply quantity bids and load serving entities provide downward sloping inverse demand functions. This mimics the operation of a spot market in a deregulated market structure. In this paper, we focus on possible mechanisms employed by the market maker to balance demand and supply. In particular, we consider three candidate objective functions that the market maker optimizes -social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. We characterize the existence of Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) in this setting and demonstrate that market outcomes at equilibrium can be very different under the candidate objective functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) began to deregulate electricity markets in various states by replacing cost-of-service regulated rates with market-based prices. The goal was to increase competition among generators and lower prices to end-consumers. However, the consequences of deregulation were unexpected; in 2000 and 2001, market manipulations led to the California electricity crisis which involved multiple large-scale blackouts and skyrocketing prices [1] . It is estimated that about $5.55 billion was paid in excess of costs between 1998 and 2001 alone [2] . Subsequently, various measures were introduced in the markets to curb such behavior. Nevertheless, market manipulation continues to exist. For instance, JP Morgan was fined $410 million for market manipulation in the markets in California and the Midwest from September 2010 to November 2012 [3] . Clearly, market power remains a major issue in electricity markets even today.
One reason for this is that electricity markets are complex. Power delivered at a particular instant of time is first procured months (or even years) ahead via long-term bilateral contracts between generators and retailers. Between one week and one day ahead of delivery, generators and retailers begin to trade in centralized electricity markets to clear imbalances. These centralized markets typically operate over multiple stages to allow market participants to exploit the increased information about supply and demand closer to delivery. The procedures for each stage are similar -generators and retailers submit offers and bids, respectively and the market operator clears the market by solving a centralized dispatch problem to minimize system costs subject to operating constraints. Payments are calculated based on locational marginal prices (LMP) which are designed to reflect local marginal costs of generation. Clearly, one expects that the market clearing mechanism employed by the market operator would play a central role in the strategic behavior of market participants.
Our goal in this paper is to study the role of the market maker (or market operator) on the efficiency of electricity markets. To that end, we formulate a game between multiple generators and a single market maker on a power network. The generators compete using a networked Cournot framework, while the market maker optimizes a regulatory objective, subject to the DC power flow equations and line constraints, to clear the market. We consider three natural objective functions for the market maker -social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. The social welfare is the consumers' utility less the costs of generation; the residual social welfare is the consumers' utility less the revenue of generators; and the consumer surplus is the consumers' utility less their payment. Note that residual social welfare is not necessarily equal to the consumer surplus, since electricity markets are not necessarily budget balanced. The latter is a byproduct of nodal pricing -generators receive local prices which might be different from the price at a different location where their power is consumed.
A. Contributions of this paper
We make two main contributions: (1) we characterize the existence of equilibria under each of the three market maker objectives, and (2) when equilibria exists, we show that the equilibrium flows could be very different under the three objectives. Our results highlight the importance of designing the market in a way that takes into account strategic generator behavior and physical system constraints. We adopt Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) as the equilibrium concept in this paper. As will be clear in Section II, the strategy set of the market maker depends on the actions of the generators; conventional Nash equilibrium framework does not apply to our setting.
Our first result is that a GNE always exists under the social welfare and residual social welfare objectives but it might not exist under the consumer surplus objective. For the latter, we provide an illustrative example in which a GNE does not exist. One of the key factors that leads to the non-existence of a GNE is that the consumer surplus is not a concave function of the market maker's decision variable. Non-existence of equilibria can have serious negative implications on market efficiency. As an example, markets with oscillatory behavior might lead to high price volatility; the resulting higher risk premiums could then translate into higher costs for the consumers.
Our second result shows that, when equilibrium exists, the market outcomes could differ significantly under the three regulatory objectives. In particular, we focus on a two-node example and show that the equilibrium flow could be positive with social welfare maximization, zero with residual social welfare maximization, and negative with consumer surplus maximization. Although all three regulatory objectives attempt to maximize some form of "consumer benefit", the exact market clearing mechanism significantly impacts the resulting strategic behavior of generators and the market equilibrium. The proofs of our results are omitted due to space constraints.
B. Related literature
Electricity markets are challenging to model and analyze due to multiple time-scales, network constraints, etc. Nevertheless, there is a sizable literature focused on analyzing the key strategic incentives of generators. The models that have been used can be largely classified into two categories -supply function competition and Cournot competition. In both approaches, it is common to assume that demand is exogenous and focus on analyzing the resulting game among generators. Here, we briefly review prior work using supply function and Cournot competition in single-stage settings. We recognize that there is also a significant body of work on multi-stage models, but we do not discuss that here as forward contracting is not the focus of the current paper.
Supply function competition: Introduced by Klemperer et al. in [4] , the key feature of supply function competition is that firms (or generators) compete by choosing supply functions specifying how much power they are willing to supply at each price. This model is appealing due to its similarity to how electricity markets operate in practice where generators typically submit step-wise increasing offer functions. Hence, this model has been frequently used both analytically and empirically to obtain insights into generator behavior [5] - [11] . In certain cases, strong theoretical results were obtained by restricting the functional form of the supply functions to a parameterized class [6] , [10] - [12] (typically affine or logarithmic). More recent work has analyzed supply function competition in settings with network transmission constraints [13] - [15] . However, to our knowledge, no work has addressed the role of the market maker under supply function competition.
Cournot competition: Dating back to 1838 [16] , [17] , Cournot competition is a well-known model in economics to study strategic interaction. As opposed to offer functions in supply function approach, the generators in Cournot competition submit a single quantity specifying how much they are willing to supply at any price. Hence, this formulation amounts to generators specifying a supply function with zero price elasticity. Although this offer model is significantly different from how electricity markets operate in practice, Cournot model often provides good explanations for observed price variations [18] , [19] . Further, this model is appealing due to its mathematical tractability. For example, analytical bounds can be derived on the efficiency loss due to strategic behavior in Cournot oligopolies [20] - [22] .
Networked Cournot competition: Markets with network constraints have also been studied with Cournot competition, e.g., in [23] - [29] . Such frameworks have been applied to domains outside electricity markets as well, defining a general networked Cournot competition [30] . However, results in [30] do not apply directly to electricity markets as they do not consider the constraints due to the underlying power network. Again, to our knowledge, no work has studied the role of the market maker in Cournot competition (with or without a network). That is precisely the focus of this paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our goal in this work is to understand how the decision of the market maker impacts the strategic incentives and the resulting market equilibrium of generators in an electricity market. We begin by formulating a game between two entities: generators located at different nodes of the network, and a market maker that balances demand and supply. Since nodal pricing is a key feature in many electricity markets, we capture this by having generators and demand face different prices depending on their location in the network.
A. Notation
Let R denote the set of real numbers and R + denote the set of non-negative real numbers. For any two vectors u, v of the same size, we say u ≥ v if the vector u − v is element-wise non-negative. Also, let 1 denote the vector of all ones of appropriate size. For any vector v ∈ R n , we denote its transpose by v . Also let v −i denote the vector of all elements in v, except the i-th entry.
B. Network model
Consider a connected power network with n nodes 1, 2, . . . , n and edges. Each node k has a generator G k that supplies a quantity of power q k ≥ 0 and incurs a cost c k q 2 k for some c k > 0. A quadratic generation cost model for conventional generators is widely used, e.g., see [31] , [32] . We assume that demand at each node k can be represented by a linear inverse demand function:
for some a k > 0 and b k ≥ 0. Here, p k (d k ) is the price that load at node k is willing to pay as a function of the quantity of power d k it receives. This form of demand function is a common assumption in economics [16] and in prior studies of electricity market models [26] - [28] . It represents an aggregate consumer with a utility function that is quadratic in the power received. We also assume that all demand functions are fixed and known to all market participants. This is a reasonable assumption when demand is highly predictable.
Suppose there is a single market maker M that balances supply and demand by choosing re-balancing quantities r k at each node such that demand at node k receives a quantity:
At each node k, the market maker charges the demand and pays the generator at a price p k (q k + r k ). This model for nodal pricing is motivated by prior studies of electricity markets, e.g. [26] - [28] . Locational marginal pricing scheme is based on the derivative of the consumer utility at a node [31] , [32] ; our model captures this interaction through an inverse demand function at each node.
Let vector q := (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) denote the production quantities of the generators and the vector r := (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r n ) denote the re-balancing quantities chosen by the market maker. We assume that the market maker chooses the vector r of re-balancing quantities, subject to the following constraints:
(i) Demand at each node is non-negative, i.e., q + r ≥ 0. To illustrate the model, the demands and rebalancing quantities for a two-node network are shown in Figure 1 . We study this example in detail in Section IV.
Notice that the set of allowable re-balancing quantities depends on the production quantities q. We denote the set of allowable re-balancing quantities by:
The shift-factor matrix H depends on the admittances of the transmission lines in the power network and encapsulates Kirchoff's laws [31] , [32] . The linear formulation of power flow constraints used in the definition of S M (q) is based on the DC power flow approximation. It is widely used in practice to clear electricity markets and compute locational marginal prices [31] , [32] . Hence, this is a reasonable choice for our purpose to study bidding behavior of generators in the electricity market. However, we remark that this approximation has its limitations for engineering applications in the power grid [33] .
C. Generator profit
Within the context described above, the profit of generator G k is given by:
We assume that each generator seeks to maximize its profit π G k (q k , q −k , r) over its production quantity q k ∈ S G k , where S G k = R + denotes the set of allowable production quantities of generator k. This implies infinite capacities for the generators, which is a common assumption in prior studies of market power [5] , [6] . Analyzing the case with finite generation capacities is clearly important; we leave it for future work.
It is interesting to note that without the strategic marketmaker and geographically distributed generators, this model reduces to the classical Cournot oligopoly model in the microeconomics literature [16] , [17] . We remark that while a more accurate model for electricity markets would use supply function bids from generators, Cournot competition is more amenable to mathematical analysis to gain insights into the role of a market maker.
D. Market maker objectives
The market maker in most electricity markets is a regulatory authority. The independent system operators (ISOs) in California or in New England are prime examples of this entity. The market maker optimizes some payoff function π M (q, r) over the re-balancing quantities r ∈ S M (q) to clear the market. Being regulatory in nature, it can choose a suitable payoff function for its operation. This choice is the market design question of interest. In what follows, we analytically compare the implications of candidate payoff functions with different objectives.
Inspired from microeconomics literature [16] , [17] , we consider the following candidates for π M (q, r):
(a) Social welfare: This is the net benefit to society. It refers to the consumers' utility less generation costs (also referred to as overall network utility). We denote it by W soc (q, r) in (2) . If generators are not strategic, this corresponds to the original optimal power flow formulation in [34] . (b) Residual social welfare: In practice, generator costs are unlikely to be known to the market maker. Hence, an alternative regulatory objective is to maximize the social welfare, less the profits of the generators. This is equivalent to the consumers' utility less the revenue of the generators. We denote it by W res (q, r) in (3). (c) Consumer surplus: This is the net benefit to consumers.
It refers to the consumers' utility less their payments. We denote it by W con (q, r) in (4).
We remark that at each node k, the amount paid by the consumers is (q k + r k ) · p k (q k + r k ), and the amount paid to the generator G k is q k · p k (q k + r k ). Hence, the market is not necessarily budget-balanced. The difference between the
total payment by demand and the total revenue of the generators is often referred to as the merchandising surplus [35] . A consequence of the market not always being budget-balanced is that the residual social welfare is not necessarily equal to the consumer surplus. Hence, it is important to explore the impact of both these objectives on the market, separately.
E. Competitive model
Given the models of the generators and the market maker, we now need to model their interaction. To do this, we consider a game with: (a) players G 1 , G 2 , . . . , G n , M ; (b) strategy sets S G 1 , S G 2 , . . . , S G n , S M ; and (c) payoffs π G 1 , π G 2 , . . . , π G n , π M , where π M is chosen to be one of the functions in {W soc , W res , W con }. Throughout, we assume that the game is feasible, i.e., the set
Since the strategy set S M (q) of the market-maker depends on the actions q of the generators, we focus on a type of equilibrium known as Generalized Nash Equilibria (GNE). Formally, an action profile (q * , r * ) constitutes a GNE if, for each 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we have:
This equilibrium concept was first introduced in 1952 by Debreu [36] . It is an extension of Nash equilibrium to settings where the strategy sets of players depend on the actions of the other players; see [37] for a detailed survey.
In practice, generators and the market maker participate in the market clearing process repeatedly. However, GNE is still a relevant equilibrium concept to investigate. One way to capture repeated interactions is via the framework of a repeated game with learning. A simple learning model is best response dynamics where players update their beliefs about the strategy of other players and maximize their payoff at each stage myopically. The GNE of the singleshot Cournot game is the limiting equilibrium under best response dynamics.
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
Within the context of the model described, we seek to investigate the following two questions in this paper: C a p a c i t y = f 1 2 Fig. 1 : Example of a two-node network. This example illustrates how the model in this paper can be used to study a caricature of the market in California. Here, northern and southern California are represented as two aggregate nodes connected by a transmission line -Path 15 -that is often congested [38] .
(1) Does a GNE always exist for each of the market maker objectives we have described, i.e., π M ∈ {W soc , W res , W con }? (2) In the cases where GNE exists, how do the market outcomes (in terms of flows, profits of generators and social welfare) differ for different market maker objectives?
We focus on the first question in this section and treat the second question in Section IV. A related question of interest is that of uniqueness of such a GNE, when it exists. In this paper, we do not address this explicitly. The following is our main result on the existence of GNE.
However, a GNE may not exist if π M = W con .
The theorem shows that the market maker objective has a significant impact on the existence of a GNE in the market. Our proof of existence of a GNE relies on a result due to Debreu [36] . One of the key factors that lead to the non-existence result for consumer surplus is that W con is not a concave function of the re-balancing quantities r.
In fact, W con is a convex function in r and hence, the optimal re-balancing quantities are at the boundaries of the feasible set S M (q). When the generator production q changes, the optimal re-balancing quantities r * could jump from one boundary point to another. This transition may not always be continuous in q, especially when network capacity constraints are binding. Hence, a fixed-point in (q, r) may not necessarily exist. In fact, we construct an example that exhibits this phenomenon using the two-node network in Figure 1 to show the non-existence of GNE for π M = W con .
Given Theorem 1, let us briefly emphasize the importance of choosing a regulatory objective that guarantees the existence of equilibria. Lack of equilibrium has serious implications. First, it can lead to volatile market prices as the market oscillates between different outcomes. This naturally increases the risk premium and the cost of forward contracting. Second, analyzing market behavior in such settings would involve studying the market dynamics. This necessitates the use of sophisticated equilibrium concepts, e.g., repeated game models and dynamic equilibria, that are often hard to characterize. Third, market monitoring becomes quite tricky for regulatory authorities. Market power measures, such as in [39] , need to be revised to account for these unreliable observations of market outcomes. Thus, non-existence of equilibrium runs the risk of complicating an already complex electricity market, both in its operation as well as its analysis.
IV. REGULATORY OBJECTIVES AND MARKET OUTCOMES
In this section, we analyze the impact of regulatory objectives on market outcomes. We focus our analysis on the case of a two-node network in Figure 1 , which represents a caricature of the situation in California. Though simple, this two-node network is enough to highlight significant differences in the impact of different regulatory objectives.
We begin with the case of unbounded line capacities. This allows us to consider a situation where the market equilibrium always exists for each regulatory objective. Additionally, it highlights that the behaviors under different objectives can differ dramatically, even in the simplest of settings.
Theorem 2. Consider the two-node network in Figure 1 . Let a 1 = a 2 := a, 1 < b 1 /b 2 ≤ 3, c 1 = c 2 := c and f 12 = ∞. Then a GNE exists for all π M ∈ {W soc , W res , W con }. Moreover, the equilibrium re-balancing quantity r * 1 = −r * 2 under the three regulatory objectives are as follows:
(a) If π M = W soc , then r * 1 < 0, (b) if π M = W res , then r * 1 = 0, (c) If π M = W con , then r * 1 > 0.
Note that, even though there are no line constraints (i.e., f 12 = ∞), the two-node network is not equivalent to an aggregated market since the price at each node is a function of the local demand function at that node. Our result illustrates how a simple market can exhibit very different equilibria under different regulatory objectives. Though all three objectives are motivated qualitatively by the identical goal of maximizing consumer benefit; one results in flow going north, one in flow going south, and one in no flow between the nodes. So, the exact choice of how costs are reflected in the objective is significant in determining the behavior of generators, the equilibrium power flows and the system efficiency. We remark that though Theorem 2 has been derived with infinite line capacity, numerical experiments suggest that the sign of r * 1 exhibit the same properties, even when the line constraint is binding.
To further emphasize the significance of π M on market efficiency, we compare the social welfare (Figure 2a ), consumer surplus (Figure 2b) , and generator profits (Figure 2c ), at the unique equilibrium under each of the three market maker objectives with varying line capacity f 12 . In our experiment, we choose the values: a 1 = a 2 = 1, b 1 = 1, b 2 = 0.65, and c 1 = c 2 = 1; the qualitative features in these plots, however, continue to hold for a wide range of parameter values. We point out some key observations from these figures. (1) The plots corresponding to π M = W con has gaps in them. For these values of f 12 , equilibrium does not exist. (2) In Figure 2a , an increase in line capacity leads to a decrease in social welfare, when π M = W con . This indicates a tradeoff between market maker objectives: having π M = W soc leads to higher social welfare but lower consumer surplus versus having π M = W con . (3) When the line capacity f 12 is increased -generator G 1 benefits more from this expansion when π M = W soc , but generator G 2 benefits more when π M = W con . Thus, different π M leads to completely different scalings of generator profits under transmission expansion. This suggests that this instrument of short-term market design has serious implications on longterm incentives as well.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we introduce a networked Cournot model for studying the impact of regulatory objectives on the equilibrium outcomes in electricity markets. In particular, we model it as a game between the market operator and the generators. Within this game, our main results explore the contrasts between three natural objectives for the market maker -social welfare, residual social welfare, and consumer surplus. We conclude that market clearing mechanism has significant impacts on both the existence and the nature of market equilibria. In particular, equilibria might not exist when the market maker maximizes the consumer surplus and the network is capacity constrained. Further, even when equilibrium exists, the power flows at equilibrium can be very different under the candidate objective functions.
